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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Appellants' Brief identifies two issues upon appeal. 
Okada Hardware Company, Ltd., hereinafter Okada Hardware, re-
minds the Court that the only issue with regard to Okada Hard-
ware is whether sufficient minimal contacts exist with the State 
of Utah to satisfy the due process requirements of the United 
States Constitution. The second issue presented concerning the 
legal effect of an alleged pro se answer applies only to co-
rrespondent Hirota Tekko, K.K. 
STATUTES 
The following statute, § 78-27-24(3), Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended, bears upon a determination of the issue 
presented: 
Any person,...whether or not 
resident of this state, who 
through an agent does any of 
enumerated acts, submits hims 
jurisdiction of the Courts of 
to any claim arising from: 
* * * 
(3) the causing of any injury within this 
State whether tortious or by breach of 
warranty; 
* * * 
a citizen or 
in person or 
the following 
elf,... to the 
this State as 
-3-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In accordance with Rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Respondent hereby concurs in the statement of the 
case made by the Appellant and does not repeat the same herein 
with two clarifications: 
a. Appellants claim in their Statement of Facts on 
page 4 of their Brief that Ernst Home Centers advertised and 
sold the same brand and model of chopping maul in their retail 
outlets in Utah. There is nothing in the record that establish-
es that the mauls referred to in the Statement of Facts were 
exported from Japan by Okada Hardware as an exclusvie supplier 
of the product. While that fact may ultimately prove to be 
true, under the record the Court should not assume that the 
similar advertised product found in Utah came through the Re-
spondent . 
b. The record establishes no contact between the 
State of Utah and the Respondent Okada Hardware except the pres-
ence within the state of the maul brought into the state by an 
Idaho purchaser as a gift to a Utah resident and the alleged 
injury. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Respondent believes that the applicable rules for 
resolution of the question of jurisdiction presented are not at 
issue. Rather, the application of the existing rules to the 
facts established by the record control the determination of 
jurisdiction. 
Respondent claims that under the facts alleged in the 
record, there are insufficient minimal contacts with the State 
of Utah to warrant the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction for the 
injury alleged by the plaintiff. No purposeful direct contact 
exists between Okada Hardware and the State of Utah. The prod-
uct at issue caused injury within the state by chance rather 
than as a result of any deliberate and purposeful contact be-
tween the Respondent and the state. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
A, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS 
Appellants have generally stated correctly the princi-
ples of law applicable to determining whether the Utah Courts 
have in personam jurisdiction over Okada Hardware. That deter-
mination is made by the application of a two-step analysis. 
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The first step in finding jurisdiction is to determine 
whether the facts, as shown by the record, fall within the Utah 
Long-arm Jurisdiction Statute, § 78-27-24(3) of the Utah Code, 
This statute extends jurisdiction over those outside of the 
state causing an injury within the state. See page 3 for the 
text of the Stati ite . This first element has not been put in 
issue as Okada Hardware has not challenged the allegation that 
plaintiff was actually injured as described iti the Complaint. 
Specif! >i.~j3 plaintif f was apparently injured while using the 
product at issue in the State of Utah. 
Once 4 • . oeen de I e rm i n e<i t h :i t the injury falls 
withi language of the long-arm statute, the analy-
sis must extend to a determination of whether sufficient con-
tacts exist between the f^r< .
 :e defendant so as to ensure 
exercise of jurisdiction '.• ;n-resident defendant 
conforms with concepts >f .*> process of law as protected by Uv:." 
Due Process Cl->. - .• - te^nUi Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. A line of cases, commencing with Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 32 6 - * S.Ct. 
154, 90 L.Ed, • -- •"':*- -<r : r-r-^d the parameters : -:n 
minimum conta:-t- question so that today a substantial body ot 
case law exists ,%; t.n i.-. v _? federal, system nnd thi". itatw to 
provide guid'-ir "•:•.-- . • :,;. •.-us Appeal. 
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Fundamentally, International Shoe held that a "thres-
hold of contacts between the defendant and forum must be estab-
lished to show that the proceeding does not offend the Court's 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice". At 
316. Jurisdiction is not found by simply adding up the number 
of contacts with the forum and concluding that such contacts are 
sufficient, but, rather, involves an analysis of the nature and 
quality of the contacts between the forum and the defendant to 
make a qualitative evaluation of whether jurisdiction ought to 
be exercised. Consequently, difficult concepts to articulate 
such as "fairness" are introduced into the analysis in a reli-
ance upon the common sense and experience of judges to determine 
when one ought to be required to defend in an unfamiliar juris-
diction . 
In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 
L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), the Supreme Court refined the search for 
fairness in determining jurisdiction by looking for purposeful 
contacts between the defendant and the forum. The defendant, a 
Delaware trustee, was found to be outside the jurisdiction of 
Florida courts because the trustee had not engaged in activity 
which invoked benefits and protection of Florida law. 
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The case law development of the nature and quality of 
purposeful minimum contacts led ta tin- ,fatr-\am :)f commerce'1 
analysis identified in the Appellants' Brief as having been 
refined in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 
100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). There, the U.S. Supreme 
Co. thp placing of a product purposefully into a 
jurisdiction was the kind of contact which qualitatively could 
cause some in the chain of sale I J u-j juDj^ar, to the jurisdic-
tion of distant forums. As explained in the opinion, the find-
ing of jurisdiction by entry into the stream of commerce is 
based upon -- . ,-^- .- "wi*h i aisciously serves a particu-
lar market derives benefit from that market through purposeful 
action and should, therefore, be responsive i inim"/ it may 
cause arisin poseful contact with the forum. 
The importance of purposeful contact on the oart, of 
the one resisting jurisdiction was --*•-. ained f i irt 11.ar' : Burger 
King Corp. . . ..adzewicz, US. ^ . , :05 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 
528 (1985 Burger King was n:t 1 products liablity case, but 
involved *-•;*> .* >":i^ i ~^ >-~ -r .* notion riven me in a 
'Mr|ip-»' 1 , . :jie::*:j;.l claimea that the forum state 
did not have sufficient contacts under the dup process clause to 
find the existence of in personam junicdiot i on . Tn analyzing 
purposeful contact with the forum state, the Supreme Court rein-
forced the rule that defendants should not be brought into a 
jurisdiction as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated 
contacts. Rather, the Court said that the contacts establishing 
jurisdiction must result from actions by the defendant himself 
that creates a substantial connection with the forum state. At 
2184. 
While not binding on this Court, Fidelity and Casualty 
Co. of N.Y. v. Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440 (10th 
Cir. 1985), is particularly helpful in an analysis of this Ap-
peal for two reasons. First, the District Court, in rendering 
its decision, relied in large part on the case. Record, p. 397. 
Second, Philadelphia Resins involved an analysis by the United 
States Court of Appeals of the long-arm statute at issue here. 
Philadelphia Resins was concerned with damaged person-
al property resulting from the use of an alleged defective ca-
ble. The plaintiff filed suit in the United States District 
Court for Utah under diversity jurisdiction and the defendant 
manufacturer responded that there were insufficient contacts 
with the state of Utah to justify the exercise of in personam 
jurisdiction. The Court found that the contacts of the defen-
dant with the State of Utah were a small number of sales of 
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products other than the type of cable at issue, advertising in a 
national trade magazine that would reach Utah, and the actual 
failure of the product at issue in the lawsuit. The Tenth Cir-
cuit Court recognized that the stream of commerce theory had 
limitations which were found in the qualitative nature of the 
contacts. The Court held that the mere occurrence of injury in 
the state was insufficient to establish jurisdiction. Addition-
ally, the presence of a small amount of other products in the 
state and some general advertising which might find its way into 
Utah were not, qualitatively, sufficient to declare jurisdiction 
existed. The Court specifically discounted the concept that the 
knowledge of the defendant of a possibility that its product 
might be taken into a region of the country had legal effect. 
At 447. 
B. UTAH CASE LAW 
The Utah Supreme Court has also considered, on a num-
ber of occasions, the sufficiency of minimal contacts to justify 
the exercise of in personam jurisdiction under the long-arm 
statute. Appellant has identified a number of those cases and 
the analysis is not repeated here generally, but some cases 
merit particular attention. 
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In Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244 
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court specifically recognized the 
due process requirement that the defendant's contacts with Utah 
be purposeful so that the defendant can be said to have reason-
ably known that he submitted to jurisdiction to answer for any 
harm caused by the action constituting his contact with Utah. 
At 246. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart correctly 
acknowledged that there are limits to finding jurisdiction based 
upon injury in the state. Specifically, jurisdiction ought not 
to be founded upon the mere fact that a plaintiff is located in 
the forum, nor should a dealer of products be subject to juris-
diction where it had no control over where the products might be 
transported. At 250. See also, Kocha v. Gibson Products Co., 
535 P.2d 680 (Utah 1975), wherein significant minimal contacts 
were found not to exist where a manufacturer of an alleged de-
fective product had no direct and purposeful contact with Utah. 
Appellants correctly identify Synergetics v. Marathon 
Ranching Co. , Ltd. , 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985), as the most re-
cent opinion of this Court analyzing concepts of minimal con-
tacts. Synergetics was not a products liability case, but con-
sidered the "doing business" portion of the long-arm statute 
which requires a similar analysis of minimal contacts. In find-
-1 1-
ing jurisdiction, this Court recognized that the mere operation 
of a interstate business alone does not justify in personam 
jurisdiction. The Court rejected a mechanical analysis of 
whether there is some contact with the state in favor of a con-
sideration of the relationship of the defendant to the forum and 
to the litigation. This consideration is done in light of 
whether the defendant has purposely availed itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activity within the forum state invoking the 
benefits and protection of the laws. Other factors, such as 
whether the cause of action has a substantial connection with 
the activity forming the contact and a balancing of the conven-
ience of the parties and the interests of the state in assuming 
jurisdiction must also be considered. At 1110. 
II. 
INSUFFICIENT MINIMAL CONTACTS EXIST 
BETWEEN OKADA HARDWARE AND THE 
STATE OF UTAH TO JUSTIFY THE 
EXERCISE OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION 
The District Court found eleven facts to exist which 
are important to a determination of jurisdiction. Record, pages 
395-396 and Addendum. Briefly, these facts are that the log 
splitter or maul which injured the plaintiff was manufactured by 
Hirota Tekko in Japan and exported from Japan by Okada Hardware. 
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The American importer, Mansour, sold the product to a wholesal-
er, Pacific Marine Schwabacher. Pacific Marine in turn sold the 
product to Ernst Home Center in the State of Washington which 
distributed it to its store in Twin Falls, Idaho, The maul was 
purchased by an Idaho resident who gave it to her father, an 
acquaintance of the plaintiff, in Utah as a gift. The District 
Court further found that the maul in question was never adver-
tised or sold in the State of Utah and that defendants "may have 
been" informed that the maul would be sold in the Western United 
States. 
The Record in this case is particularly important for 
what it does not establish. There is no evidence that Okada 
Hardware has any representative in the United States, much less 
the State of Utah. There is no evidence that Okada Hardware had 
a purposeful intent to place products in Utah or had otherwise 
qualified to do business here. Rather, Appellants rely upon a 
general assertion that the defendants knew the product would be 
distributed in the Western United States. There is no evidence 
that the Japanese corporations knew anything at all about Utah, 
much less had some kind of purposeful control in directing its 
product into the state. The same product was, admittedly, ad-
vertised for sale through Ernst in Utah, but the record does not 
show Okada Hardware was the exclusive exporter. 
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In light of the facts found by the District Court and 
shown in the record, it can be said that the only contact Okada 
Hardware had with the State of Utah was the mere occurrence of 
the injury unless the stream of commerce theory is extended to 
these facts. As explained below, the application of the stream 
of commerce theory is inappropriate here. 
In applying the stream of commerce theory to the facts 
of record, the Appellants would render what was intended as one 
test for determining purposeful contact with the forum into a 
meaningless legal conclusion whereby jurisdiction would always 
be found to exist if a product is found in the state. 
The Appellants are asking this Court to convert the 
"stream of commerce" theory into an "ocean of commerce" theory. 
Specifically, Appellants ask the Court to give undue weight 
under the facts in the record to the foreseeability that a prod-
uct might end up in Utah. The stream of commerce theory was 
intended to describe the concept of one purposefully placing its 
product into a flow of goods which had an obvious point of con-
clusion, or contact. To continue the analogy, Appellants are 
suggesting that once a manufacturer or distributor casts his 
product into the general ocean of commerce, it is foreseeable 
that it will wash up on shore somewhere. Thus, the mere engag-
ing in commerce becomes the basis for finding in personam juris-
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diction and principles of purposeful contact invoking the pro-
tection of the forum are abandoned. 
The very evils which the opinions in the federal and 
state cases examined in part I attempt to avoid are present in 
this case. For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice White 
warned against giving foreseeability so much weight in the anal-
ysis that the result becomes "Every seller of chattels would in 
effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process". 
At 296. Similarly, the entry of the product into Utah was a 
matter of happenstance that the father of the purchaser of the 
product lived in the state. Consequently, the entry of the 
product into the state was not purposeful, but random and for-
tuitous as denounced by Burger King. 
The assertion that Okada Hardware may have known that 
its product would be distributed in Utah is an attempt to rely 
upon mere forseeability of possibility of contact with Utah 
which was rejected in Philadelphia Resins. Additionally, there 
is no evidence that Okada Hardware conducted activities with 
respect to the product causing injury in which it sought the 
benefit and protection of the laws of the state as required by 
Synergetics. 
Applying the Synergetics analysis further, the record 
contains nothing of substance which helps to analyze the rela-
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tionship of the defendant to the forum beyond that of simply 
having the product enter the state by chance. A consideration 
in the relationship between the defendant and the forum is that 
Okada Hardware is a citizen of a foreign nation. Record, p. 
322. Appellants have simply assumed that citizens of Japan, 
without representatives in the United States, stand with manu-
facturers located within the United States in determining their 
relationship to the forum. Assumptions are substituted for 
evidence that these foreign defendants understood, sufficient to 
constitute purposeful contact, the marketing plans of the re-
tailers and distributors located three or four places down the 
chain of distribution. 
To prove some relationship between the forum and the 
defendant exists sufficient to justify exercise of jurisdiction, 
the record should contain facts showing that the foreign corpor-
ations actually intended to serve a particular market rather 
than simply supply the United States. Otherwise, once the 
Courts have concluded that the intent to service the United 
States market is sufficient to establish jurisdiction, there is 
no practical limit on finding jurisdiction in any place the 
plaintiff happens to be. 
Finally, the approach of the Appellants to finding 
jurisdiction ignores the concepts of state sovereignty which 
-16-
underly the entire analysis under the Due Process Clause. The 
purpose of the required analysis is to determine the constitu-
tional bounds on states within a federal system to reach outside 
of their borders and bring a defendant into their Courts. See 
World-Wide Volkswagen at 286. By analyzing the stream of com-
merce in broad terms such as the United States market or the 
Western United States market, the plaintiffs have conceptually 
expanded jurisdiction from an analysis of individual state power 
in a federal system to a regional or national level. The cor-
rect inquiry on this Appeal is to determine whether Utah may 
reach out into Japan to bring defendants into its Courts under 
the facts in the record. Focus must not be shifted from pur-
poseful minimal contacts with Utah to some general notion of 
regional minimal contact else the fundamental principles of due 
process in a federal system of states be abandoned. 
CONCLUSION 
The parties appear to be in basic agreement of the 
applicable constitutional standards for this Appeal. What is at 
issue is the application of those standards to the facts as 
contained in the record. 
The only contact of Okada Hardware with Utah estab-
lished in the Record is the alleged injury. Due Process re-
-17-
quires more. A state may extend its jurisdiction over those 
which have meaningful contact with the state. The facts on 
record here fail to show meaningful, purposeful contacts under 
the established stream of commerce theory or under any other 
analysis. Expansion of any theory to reach the Respondent under 
these facts is done only at the peril of rendering meaningless 
fundamental principles of Due Process and state sovereignty by 
eliminating any conceptual limit to jurisdiction. Consequently, 
this Court should affirm the dismissal of the Complaint and 
Third-Party Complaint by the District Court for want of in per-
sonam jurisdiction. 
DATED this 10th day of November, 1986. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
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ADDENDUM 
This addendum consists of the Ruling on third-party 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Service, dated Febru-
ary 13, 1986, and the Ruling dated April 17, 1986, by the Honor-
able Rodney S. Page. The originals of these Rulings are con-
tained in the official Record. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
BRUCE G. PARRY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERNST HOME CENTER CORP. et. al. 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 33206 
The plaintiffs having filed a Motion to Reconsider in this 
matter and counsel having filed Memorandums in support thereof 
and in opposition thereto, and the Court having reviewed the 
same, hereby rules as follows: 
The Court feels that procedure and the law do not preclude 
the Court's consideration of a Motion to Reconsider, but that any 
decision to reconsider should be exercised by the Court with care 
and only in very limited circumstances with the objective of 
placing on counsel a burden of being fully knowledgeable about 
their case and presenting all relevant facts to the Court for 
consideration at the appropriate time. 
In this matter on the critical question of jurisdiction the 
position of co-counsel in the case the Court has reconsidered its 
decision based upon the new material submitted but finds that as 
here where defendants are isolated by three levels of 
distribution from the transaction which caused the injury, the 
mere fact that the product is sold in this state does not alter 
the Court's opinion. The Court still concludes that the 
defendant engaged in no purposeful contacts with the State of 
Utah which would provide the necessary minimum contacts to 
justify the State exercising jurisdiction in this matter. 
The Court also stands by its ruling that defendant Hirota 
Tekko did not submit itself to jurisdiction of the Court by its 
letter of response. 
The Court will execute the order of dismissal of Okada 
Hardware and Hirota Tekko forthwith. 
DATED this / f day of April, A.D., 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
RODNEY S. PAGE 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /? ^"day of April, 1986, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to the 
following counsel: 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
Commercial Security Building Tower 
Suite 700 
50 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Mary Ellen Sloan 
1000 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Daniel G. Darger 
No. 100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephen J. Hill 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Roger R. Fairbanks 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City Utah 84101 
Donald J. Purser 
Barbara K. Berrett 
340 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Leslie Snow, Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
BRUCE G. PARRY, : 
Plaintiff, : RULING ON THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO QUASH 
vs. : SERVICE 
ERNST HOME CENTER CORP, : Civil No. 2-33206 
et. al. 
Defendants. : 
The Court having heard the arguments of counsel, and 
having reviewed the memorandum and pleadings submitted and being 
fully advised in the premises rules as follows: 
First as to defendant's motion to quash the summons 
in this matter on the basis that service upon them did not comply 
with Rule 4 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court finds 
that each of the defendants, Okada Hardware Ltd and Hirota Tekko KK, 
were served with a copy of the Summons and Third Party Complaint 
pursuant to the Convention of Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-
judicial Documents in Civil or Criminal Matters, by service on 
the Japanese Minister of Fireign Affairs. The Minister, by letter 
dated September 6, 1985, certified that the Summons and Third 
Party Complaint had been served on the defendant, Okada, on August 
2, 1985, and on defendant, Hirota, on August 10, 1985. 
The Court concludes that such service substantially 
complies with the requirements of Rule 4(b)(3) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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The Court having concluded that the service procedure 
was correct, next turns to the question of whether the fact that 
the Summons served on these defendants required a response within 
twenty (20) days rather than the thirty (30) days required of 
non-resident defendants under §78-27-25 Utah Code Annotated was 
such a defect as to justify the quashing of the Summons. 
The Court notes that Section 4(h) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure allows a summons to be amended at any time unless it 
appears that material prejudice would result to substantial rights 
of the parties. 
In the matter under consideration, each of the defendants 
was served between August 2nd and August 10thf 1985. Counsel 
for each of the defendants requested and received extentions in 
which to file pleadings until January of 1986. 
The Court concludes that defendants were properly served 
and were put on notice that they had to take action to defend 
themselves. There is no evidence that defendants relied on rhe 
twenty (20) day period to their detriment; on the contrary, they 
were granted in excess of one hundred (100) days to respond. Myers 
vs. Investment Corporation, 632 P2d 879 Ut. (1981) 
The Court notes that as the Utah Sumpreme Court stated 
in Myers, supra: 
"In the absence of prejudice, it is appropriate 
to pursue that policy which favors resolution 
of disputes on the merits rather than techni-
calities" Supra, P. 882 
In that light, the Court will allow the summons to be 
amended on its own motion and finds that service on the defendants 
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of Mansour's Third Party Complaint and Summons was proper. 
Defendants have conceded, as the Court would have found, 
that service of plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint on these 
defendants was valid. 
The Court, having concluded that service of plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint and Mansour's Third Party Complaint against 
these defendants was valid, next turns to the more difficult ques-
tion of whether the Court has jurisdiction over these defendants 
pursuant to our Long Arm Statute and the Due Process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Section 78-27-24(3) Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 
extends the jurisdiction of Utah Courts to non-resident defendants 
who cause injury within the State by tortious acts or breach of 
warranty. 
In the matter before the Court the plaintiff was allegedly 
injured by a flying piece of metal from a log splitter manufactured 
by defendant Hirota and exported to zhe United States by defendant 
Okada. 
Under the pleadings, it is clear that the facts of this 
case come within the purview of the Long Arm Stature so as to 
give the Court in personam jurisdiction over these defendants 
pursuant to that provision; however, the analysis does not stop 
there. No*only must the allegations place the defendants in that 
catagory of persons over whom our State legislature has extended 
State jurisdiction, but in addition must be examined to determine 
if there exists such minimum contacts between the forum state 
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and the defendants such that the exercise of in personam jurisdic-
tion would not offend the traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice required under the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. International Shoe Co. vs. State of Washinaton 
.... i * 
et. al., 326 US 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L Ed. 95 (1945) 
At the outset it must be noted that the burden of proving 
basis for jurisdiction is on the party asserting it and that the 
facts of each case must be examined independently. 
In the matter before the Court, the Court finds the 
facts as follows: 
1. That the defendant, Hirota Manufacturing Company, 
is a Japanese company which manufactures various products in Japan 
which it sells to Okada Hardware in Japan for export to the United 
States. 
2. That Okada Hardware Ltd is a Janapese corporation 
which purchases items for exportation to the United States, among 
them the log splitter in question. 
3. That Okada Hardware exported the log splitter to 
the Third Party plaintiff, Monsour, in California for sale in 
the United States. 
4. That Monsour sold the log splitter to its distributor 
Pacific Marine Schwabaker. 
5. That Pacific Marine Schwabaker then sold the log 
splitter to various retailers in the western U.S., including 
Pay N Save/Ernst Home Center Corporation. 
6. That Ernst Home Center in Twin Falls, Idaho, sold 
the said log splitter to one Linda Thayne in December, 1979. 
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7. That said Linda Thayne gave the log splitter to 
a relative in Utah. 
8. That plaintiff was injured while using the log splitter 
in Utah in January of 1980. 
9. That the log splitter in question was never advertised 
or sold in the State of Utah. 
10. That defendants may have been informed that the 
log splitter would be sold in the western United States. 
11. That there was no evidence that either of the defendants 
either sold or advertised any of their products in the State of 
Utah. 
It is clear to the Court that under the more traditional 
concepts of "minimum contacts", the facts of this case would not 
provide sufficient basis to justify the Court in extending in 
personam jurisdiction; however, as a result of increased trade 
and interaction between the various states and nations over the 
past ten years there has developed a theory of rationale for extend-
ing jurisdiction under a doctrine referred to as the "stream of 
commerce theory" in certain cases. 
The concept was most recently treated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in World-Wide Volkwagon Corp. vs. Woodson, 444 US 286, 100 
S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed 2d 490(1980); and even more recently by our 
own 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Fidelty Casualty Co. vs. 
Philadelphia Resins Corp, (USCA 10th Cir.) 766 F2d 440 (1985). 
In World-Wide, supra, the Supreme Court refused to grant 
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in personam jurisdiction over a New York Audi dealer and distributor 
doing business in New Yorkf New Jersey and Connecticut, to an 
Oklahoma court. In that case, plaintiff, who had purchased the 
vehicle from defendant in New York, was injured in Oklahoma while 
on his way to Arizona in an accident which involved an alleged 
defect in the vehicle. 
The Court, in denying jurisdiction to the Oklahoma court, 
found no circumstances on which to predicate in personam jurisdiction 
and stated: 
"Petitioners (defendants)carry on no activity 
whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales and 
perform no services there. They avail themselves 
of none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma 
law. They solicit no business there either through 
sales persons or through advertising reasonably 
calculated to reach the state. Nor does the record 
show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale 
or retail to Oklahoma residents, or customers, or 
that they indirectly, through other, serve or seek 
to serve the Oklahoma market". World-wide, supra 
62 LEd 2d 493. 
The Court went on to say that Oklahoma was attempting 
to assert jurisdiction on one isolated occurance and wharever 
inferences that could be drawn therefrom and that was not a sufficent 
basis for jurisdiction. 
In a more recent case, and one involving the application 
of Utah law, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to extend 
in personam jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania corporation where 
some of its defective cable, sold in Arkansas, was subsequently 
brought to Utah by the purchaser and caused damage in Utah. 
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The facts in that case were that a helicopter pilot 
in Arkansas purchased fiber cable from defendant m Pennsylvania 
for delivery in Arkansas. An employee of the defendant was told 
it would be used in the Rocky Mountains in seismic operations. 
The pilot brought the cable to Utah where it failed, causing damage. 
The evidence showed that the pilot had seen advertising for the 
cable in a national trade magazine which presumably reached Utah; 
that defendant sold a variety of products in all fifty states; 
that from 1978 through 1980 defendant sold to 10 customers in 
Utah; that Utah sales were less than 1/10 of 1% of defendant's 
gross sales; that defendant never sold any cable in Utah. 
The Court, in denying jurisdiction, held that a mmiscule 
number of sales of products other than cable, advertising in a 
national trade magazine that presumably reaches Utah, and the 
failure of one of its defective cables in Utah after the cable 
was taken there by a customer, was not sufficient minimum contacts 
to justify the lower courtfs imposing in personam jurisdiction 
over the defendant. 
In so ruling the Court stated that if defendant's products 
come into the forum state as the result of the actions of an un-
connected third party or of fortuitous events over which defendant 
has no control, the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction 
of the forum state. 
The Court further noted that foreseeability alone has 
never been a sufficient benchmark for in personam jurisdiction 
under Due Process. The mere liklihood that a product would find 
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its way into the forum state was not enough; rather, it is that 
the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are 
such that he should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court 
there. 
In this case the plaintiff and Third Party defendant, 
Monsour, have the burden of proving to the Court sufficient basis 
to justify the extention of in personam jurisdiction over these 
defendants. While this court does not entirely agree with the 
decision of the Circuit Court in Fidelity, supra, it does find 
that the facts in this case are insufficient to support in personam 
jurisdiction over the defendants Hirota Tekko KK and Okada Hardware 
Co., Ltd. and the complaints against these defendants are dismissed. 
Counsel for Okada is directed to prepare an Order in 
accordance with the Courtfs ruling. 
DATED this d\>^ day of February, A.D., 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
RODNEY SJ PAGE 
District Court Judge 
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